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Fetal Rights and Prenatal Substance Abuse: A Comparative Law Perspective  
 
“May be human beings have not evolved enough to hold the complex idea that many things can 
be true at the same time. We can feel a certain way. We can value the unborn as a matter of 
religion, ethics, or experience, but we can’t do that as a matter of law and still value pregnant 
women.” – Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director, National Advocates for Pregnant Women1 
Part I Introduction 
 Amanda Kimbrough, a 32-year old Alabama woman, admits she has a drug problem. 
Kimbrough, who was pregnant with her third child in 2008, said she used methamphetamine 
only once during the pregnancy.
2
  “I don’t even know why I done it. I guess the Devil knocked 
on my shoulder that day,” Kimbrough said to a reporter with The New York Times.3  The child, 
named Timmy Jr., was born premature at 25 weeks in April of 2008. The boy weighed 2 pounds 
1 ounce and lived only 19 minutes.
4
 Kimbrough tested positive for meth and as a result, her two 
older children were removed from her custody and she was allowed only supervised visits for 90 
days.
5
  She was also ordered to drug treatment and parenting classes.
6
  However, law 
enforcement’s intervention did not end there. Six months after the baby’s death, she was charged 
with chemical endangerment of a child, a Class A felony, which carries a mandatory sentence of 
10 years to life.
7
  
Alabama’s chemical endangerment law in the state’s criminal code provides: 
A responsible person commits the crime of chemical endangerment  
                                                          
1
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2
 Id.   
3
 Id.  
4
 Id.  
5
 Id.  
6
 Id.  
7 ALA. CODE § 26-14-3.2 (2006)  
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of exposing a child to an environment which he or she does any of the 
 following: 
 
1. Knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally causes or permits a child to  
be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled  
substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in § 13A-12-260.  
 
2. Violates § 26-15-3.2(a)(1) and a child suffers physical injury by  
exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled  
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.  
 
3. Violates subdivision § 26-15-3.2(a)(1) and the exposure, ingestion,  
inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child.
8
  
 
The State of Alabama argued that the term “child” in the statute extends to an unborn 
child, and that the term “environment,” includes the uterus or womb. In its case against 
Kimbrough, the State relied on a decision by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which 
upheld this broad interpretation of the chemical-endangerment statute.
9
 In its defense of this 
interpretation, the Colbert County Assistant District Attorney Angela Hulsey, told The New York 
Times, that “[Kimbrough] caused the death of another person, a person that will never have the 
chance to go to school, go to the prom, get married, have children of their own. You’re dealing 
with the most innocent of victims.”10 At the end of State’s case, Kimbrough’s attorney advised 
her to plead guilty, but reserved the right to appeal the conviction on constitutional grounds.
11
   
 There is no denying that substance abuse during pregnancy is a pervasive problem. 
According to a national survey on drug use and health, among pregnant women aged 15 to 44, 
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5.0 percent were using illegal drugs in 2010-2011.
12
 In comparison, the rate among women in 
this age group who were not pregnant was 10.8 percent.
13
 In addition, a recent study by the 
Journal of the American Medical Association found that the number of pregnant women using 
opiate drugs and the number of babies born experiencing withdrawal symptoms rose sharply 
over the last decade.
14
  While medical experts disagree as to the extent of harm controlled 
dangerous substances can inflict upon a developing fetus, nearly all agree that drug use among 
pregnant women needs to be addressed and discouraged.
15
  While nearly all advocate for treating 
the drug- addicted woman through treatment programs, states have used a variety of methods, in 
combination with treatment, in an attempt to target prenatal substance abuse. Some states have 
expanded their civil child-welfare laws to include prenatal substance abuse as a factor in 
determining whether grounds exist to terminate parental rights due to abuse or neglect, while 
some have authorized civil commitment of pregnant drug-users.
16
 While all states have drug laws 
that make it a crime to be in possession, use or distribute drugs classified as controlled dangerous 
substances, as many as thirty-three states currently have criminal statutes that address the issue 
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 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2011 National Survey 
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of exposing children to illegal drug activity.
17
 Prosecutors in some states have tried to rely on 
“chemical-endangerment” laws to target prenatal substance abuse.18 Prosecutors in states such as 
South Carolina and Alabama, have been using certain criminal laws on the books and filing 
charges against women for their conduct during pregnancy.
19
  While most attempts to convict 
pregnant women for their prenatal conduct using state criminal statutes have been unsuccessful 
or have resulted in overturned convictions, many women are still spending time behind bars and 
using precious resources to defend themselves against the charges stemming from a woman’s 
drug use while pregnant.
20
   
This paper will examine the issue of fetal rights, through the perspective of criminal laws 
used to prosecute women for their conduct while pregnant. It will provide a comparative analysis 
of the constitutional protections (or lack thereof) bestowed upon the unborn in the United States 
and the Dominican Republic; two countries who take drastically different takes on the issue of 
fetal rights. It will also examine Canada’s interpretation of fetal rights. Part II will address the 
constitutions in these three countries, which explicitly balance the rights between privacy rights 
of women and the rights of the unborn. In the Dominican Republic for example, some would 
suggest the balance tilts in favor of fetal rights. Part III of this paper will discuss the fetus as a 
plaintiff and its ability to sue third parties and the success of suits against the mother for prenatal 
conduct in these countries. Part IV will examine the fetus as a victim of crime, and determine 
whether the law applied there should be applied to the unique mother-unborn child relationship.  
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 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Parental Drug Use as Child Abuse – State Statutes, July 2012, 
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  Interview with Farah Diaz-Tello, Staff Attorney, National Advocates for Pregnant Women (Oct. 
2012)(Tello adds that her office is also seeing prosecutors attempt to charge pregnant women for their 
conduct using state criminal law in Texas and Tennessee).  
20
 Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America’s Criminalization of Maternal 
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This paper does not attempt to justify illegal conduct by pregnant women nor does it take 
the position that pregnant women who use drugs should be absolved of criminal liability, simply 
by virtue of being pregnant. It does however maintain that there are presently criminal laws 
designed to deal with drug use and possession and that a statute, targeting a woman because she 
is using drugs and happens to be pregnant, is problematic constitutionally and presents problems 
on the public policy front, because it discourages women from getting help out of fear of 
criminal sanctions. Through this analysis, the paper will discuss recommendations that include 
relying on drug laws currently on the books to prosecute women who use drugs while pregnant, 
rather than creating a whole new charge based on conduct alleged to have affected the fetus. 
Statutes that do attempt to target people who possess drugs around minors should include an 
exception for pregnant women, such as Missouri’s chemical-endangerment statute. Furthermore, 
states should be relying on civil laws, taking prenatal substance abuse into account to make 
determinations as to parental rights once the child is born, and should focus on the treatment of 
drug-addicted women through drug-treatment programs rather than through jail time.  
Part II The Constitution and the Balance Between Privacy Rights and the Rights of the 
Unborn 
 
A. The United States  
 
 In its attempt to determine the rights afforded to a woman and her fetus, the Supreme 
Court of the United States turns to the Constitutional provisions dealing with privacy and liberty. 
Regarding the issue of privacy, while the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly enumerate a right 
to privacy, the Court has ruled that privacy is a fundamental right protected by substantive due 
process.
21
 While privacy is not explicitly provided, there are amendments in the Constitution 
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 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)  (Court held that that “specific guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.”).  
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where the notions of privacy are apparent, and the privacy notion is also inherent in the Bill of 
Rights.
22
 In determining whether a privacy right exists in regard to the choice to procreate, the 
Court determined in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), that if a fundamental right was 
at issue, any legislative actions must be narrowly tailored to effectuate the legitimate state 
interests asserted.
23
  
 In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) the court applied the framework used in Griswold, 
and determined that the claim that a fetus is a person is not supported by the Constitution.
24
 The 
Court determined that the “right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,” but added 
that the right is not absolute and that important state interests must be considered when 
proposing regulations.
25
 The Court also added that “that at some point the state interests as to the 
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.”26 The Court added 
that in comparing this privacy interest with the privacy interests previously before the Court, this 
one is quite different as the woman’s privacy interest is not sole nor is it isolated.27 This “point” 
that the Court mentions, and in the State has a legitimate interest, is at viability.
28
 The Court 
referred to medical knowledge at the time, and deemed it to be the third trimester, somewhere 
between the 24
th
 and 28
th
 week of pregnancy.
29
 The viability standard enunciated in Roe remains 
the standard today, despite the medical advances which have given babies born earlier than the 
stated viability estimate a chance at survival.  
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 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (Court stated that it recognized a right of personal privacy in 
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23
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 The additional constitutional basis implicated by the criminalization of a woman’s 
conduct while pregnant is the concept of personal liberty. Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Roe is 
particularly applicable and should be considered, as he opined that, “[i]n a Constitution for a free 
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of “liberty” must be broad indeed.”30 This is 
essentially the core of the 14
th
 Amendment Equal Protection, which provides that no state shall 
deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person equal protection of the laws.”31 In Roe, the Court determined that the word “person,” 
included in the 14
th
 Amendment, does not include the unborn, but naturally includes the 
mother.
32
 The Court in Casey followed this line of reasoning, recognizing the unique human 
condition of pregnancy and that these personal and intimate decisions in connection to that 
pregnancy are the core of liberty protected by the 14
th
 Amendment.
33
 It also added that a liberty 
violation is present in limited circumstances, when the state’s regulation is so burdensome that it 
places an “undue burden” on the woman’s ability to make the personal decision.34 This concept 
illustrates the deference paid to a woman’s liberty interest, and the Court’s reluctance to allow 
States to interfere with a woman’s ability to decide whether to carry a pregnancy to term. These 
cases, upholding a woman’s right to chose based on liberty and its outweighing of the state’s 
interest in potential human life, are important to the issue regarding the criminalization of a 
woman’s conduct while pregnant, because the criminalization of this conduct could very well 
coerce a woman to end a pregnancy, out of fear of criminal sanctions should she give birth to a 
child affected in some way by her illicit drug use.   
                                                          
30
 Roe, 410 U.S at 168  (Stewart, J., concurring)(Citing this proposition, cited in Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).). 
31
 U.S. Const. art. XIV, § 1 
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 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.  
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 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 852-54. 
34
 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 874. 
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 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has characterized the right to marry and 
procreate as “one of the most basic civil rights of man.”35 The Court reiterated the protection of 
this right in subsequent cases, adding that “[t]he decision whether or not to beget or bear a child 
is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.”36 It must be mentioned 
however, that not every state has embraced the notion that the right to procreate is absolute.  In 
Wisconsin for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a judge’s probation condition 
on a man with nine children whom he consistently failed to support, could not have any more 
children until he proved he was able to support them, was constitutional.
37
  The court added that 
while it recognizes the right to procreate as a fundamental right, the probation condition was 
exactly that: a condition, and was not an outright ban.
38
 Also, the court stated it was reasonably 
related to the objective of rehabilitation and was not overbroad. Further, it reasoned that 
convicted individuals do not enjoy these rights to the same degree as those who have not been 
convicted of a crime.
39
  
In addition to a woman’s fundamental right to carry a pregnancy to term and right to an 
abortion, is the concept of dignity. Dignity is a word that can be found in a number of 
constitutions around the world
40
 and in some transnational declarations, however it is not an 
enunciated concept in the United States Constitution, but a word occasionally invoked in United 
States court decisions.
41
 While this notion of dignity is not specifically mentioned in the 
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 Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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 Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). 
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 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [Constitution] May 8, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 10 (S. 
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 See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86  NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 185-
86 (Author refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides, “All human beings are 
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American Constitution, it is still worthy of discussion, as it is a word utilized by the Personhood 
movement in the United States, which stands behind attempts and policies extending legal 
protection to the fetus, and is used by numerous advocates that oppose laws criminalizing the 
conduct of pregnant women by way of its affect on the fetus.
42
  The dignity term, although 
perhaps not expressly provided, has been invoked in prior United States Supreme Court 
decisions in the context of Equal Protection challenges involving gender or race.
43
 Dignity is 
used as courts attempt to reconcile the conflict between a woman’s fundamental right to privacy 
and the “fetus’ right to physical integrity.”44 As this paper will show, states take different 
approaches in balancing the woman’s privacy interest, the state’s interest in the potential life, and 
in creating measures that are tailored to achieving the objective of deterring drug use among 
pregnant women. Interestingly, Justice Stevens foreshadowed the potential for conflict in Casey, 
by quoting Ronald Dworkin, a professor of law and philosophy, Stevens wrote: 
“The suggestion that states are free to declare a fetus a person….assumes that  
a state can curtail some persons’ constitutional rights by adding new persons 
 to the constitutional population….If fetus is not part of the constitutional  
population, under the national constitutional arrangement, then states have 
 no power to overrule that national arrangement by themselves by declaring  
that fetuses have rights competitive with the constitutional rights of women.”45  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
born free and equal in dignity and rights.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at art. I (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
42
 See Personhood Pro-Life & Pro-Human Policy for the 21
st
 Century, http://www.personhood.net/ (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2012) (Organization promotes the notion that the unborn should constitutionally be 
deemed “persons.” States the sanctity of life is the bedrock of human dignity.); See also Katharine 
McCabe, What About the Personhood of Women?, National Advocates for Pregnant Women (Nov. 6, 
2012, 2:38 PM), 
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2012/07/what_about_the_personhood_of_w.php.   
43
 Neomi Rao, Gender, Race, and Individual Dignity: Evaluating Justice Ginsberg’s Equality 
Jurisprudence, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053, 1059-62 (2009) (Article refers to United v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
515 (1996), as although Justice Ginsberg did not use the word “dignity,” her opinion reaffirms the value 
in a woman’s choice to make decisions for herself, here, in the education context).  
44
 Deanna Rae Reitman, The Collision Between the Rights of Women, The Rights of the Fetus and the 
Rights of the State: A Critical Analysis of the Criminal Prosecution of Drug Addicted Pregnant Women, 
16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 267, 270 (2002).  
45
 Lynn Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 
999, 1010 (1999) (Citing Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 913 n.2 (Stevens, J. concurring)).  
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 In the United States, the unique relationship between federal and state law, as well as the 
Constitutional protections afforded women in regard to abortion and the right of a state to have a 
compelling interest in potential life, creates a basis from which courts can analyze the 
phenomena of criminalizing prenatal conduct. States, through the 10
th
 Amendment, their 
individual constitutions, and statutory codes also play a role in the decisions handed down by 
state courts regarding state interest in potential life.
46
 
B. Canada 
 The Canadian Constitution provides in Section 7 under the Legal Rights portion, that 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”47 Unlike the Dominican 
Republic, which is discussed infra, Canada has not decided as to whether this right extends to the 
unborn. Section 7 was interpreted in the context of abortion rights in the country’s Supreme 
Court decision addressing abortion.
48
 In the 1960s, the Canadian government legalized abortions, 
however included restrictions such as needing committee approval prior to the abortion.
49
  In the 
1980s Dr. Morgentaler had been performing abortions with prior committee approval and in a 
clinic rather than an accredited hospital, as mandated by law. 
50
 Morgentaler was subsequently 
charged and claimed the law violated Section 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.
51
 The Supreme Court of Canada held that the applicable criminal section was 
                                                          
46
 U.S. Const. amend. X 
47
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act, 1982 c. 7 (U.K.).  
48
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).   
49
 Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at para. 5.  
50
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 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act, 1982 c. 2(a) (U.K.) (Article provides, “Everyone has the following fundamental 
freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion.”); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of 
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unconstitutional.
52
 Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada opined that the 
criminal code, imposing criminal sanctions on a woman and forcing her to carry a pregnancy to 
term, unless “she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations,” is a 
breach of the security of the person, as defined in Section 7.
53
 The majority also added that the 
restrictions provided in the code, would create undue delay in obtaining an abortion and 
therefore, create more potential for harm and risk to the woman, which constitutes an assault on 
the bodily integrity guaranteed by Section 7.
54
  
 Furthermore, the court added that the law fails under Section 1, which allows for 
restrictions by law, “as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”55 The 
court approached the issue using the proportionality test and found first, that the procedure and 
administrative requirements were arbitrary.
56
 Second, the limitations were viewed as being out of 
proportion with the objectives, because the restrictions would have actually harmed women by 
forcing them to essentially jump through administrative hoops, creating dangerous delay as the 
pregnancy progresses, and therefore impeding the objective.
57
 While the court did not say what 
kind of restrictions would be appropriate, it did add that protection of the fetus is a valid 
objective, however the means by which the Parliament went about it was not proportional and 
not in accord with Section 1.
58
 It is important to note that the court did not address whether or not 
the fetus is a person or should be included in the “everyone” term used in Section 7. The court 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 c. 12 (U.K.) (Article provides, 
“Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”). 
52
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).   
53
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, para. 20 (Can.).   
54
 Id. at para. 57.   
55
 Id. at para. 55 (The Court states that, “[f]inally the effects of the limitation upon the s. 7 rights of many 
pregnant women are out of proportion to the objective sought to be achieved.”).  
56
 Id. at para. 55.   
57
 Id. at para. 55.  
58
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essentially punts on that question by stating that because the court determined that the criminal 
code section included restrictions that would have impeded on a woman’s liberty interest, the 
issue as to whether a fetus has a right to “life, liberty, and security of the person,” was not 
decided.
59
  It also did not enumerate, like the United States decision in Roe, at what point and 
under what circumstances, the country’s interest in unborn life would override a woman’s 
interest in having an abortion.
60
 Nor did it provide any type of guidance for Parliament as to what 
restrictions on abortion would be deemed proportional and therefore, constitutional.
61
 As a result 
of this holding, there is currently no law restricting abortion in Canada, however it is controlled 
through legislation that covers the safety of medical procedures.
62
  
 In a 1989 a case before the Canadian Supreme Court, the court finally resolved the issue 
as to whether a fetus has rights, but only as provided by Quebec’s Civil Code and the common 
law.
63
 The case came before the court in the context of a father filing for an injunction in order to 
prevent a girlfriend from aborting his unborn child.
64
 Interestingly, the court refused to address 
the issue as to whether a fetus has a right to life under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, because the respondent did not assert Section 7 as a defense of his rights, 
nor on behalf of the fetus.
65
  The court added that because the Charter can only be used when 
there is some kind of state action, it refused to consider whether “Section 7 could be used to 
                                                          
59
 Id. at para. 56. 
60
 Id. at para. 54-56 (The Court states that protecting the potential life is a legitimate government interest, 
however states the restrictions provided in criminal code 251 are not proportional. It adds that a fetus may 
in fact “be deserving of constitutional recognition under Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms” but that “there can be no escape from the fact that Parliament has failed to establish either a 
standard or a procedure whereby any such interests might prevail over those of a woman in a in a fair and 
non-arbitrary fashion.”).  
61
 National Abortion Federation, Legal Abortion in Canada, http://www.prochoice.org/canada/legal.html 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2012).  
62
 Id.  
63
 Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (Can.).   
64
 Id. at *9.  
65
 Id. at *45.  
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ground an affirmative claim to protection by the state.”66  The court held that a fetus has no legal 
rights under the common law or the civil code, but did not address any rights that might flow 
from Section 7.
67
 Furthermore, the court addressed the argument by the respondent father that the 
civil code provides sections that implicitly give rights to the fetus. One of those codes includes 
inheritance provisions.
68
 Essentially, the father in the case argued that if the civil code of the 
country protects a fetus’ economic interest, surely it must protect its interest in life.69 In response 
to this argument, the court opined that the fetus in the civil law context is a “fiction of civil law,” 
and that the civil code’s statutory provisions addressing the fetus only maintain the purpose of 
protecting property until the fetus’ birth.70 In addition, the court stated that in regard to 
respondent’s last argument, that there is no legal precedent allowing a man to prevent a woman 
from obtaining an abortion in order to protect his interest in the potential life he helped create.
71
 
The court essentially provides that the fetus has no legal rights in this case under the Quebec 
Civil Code and the Canadian common law, and articulated its adherence to the country’s born-
alive rule which grants legal rights upon the birth of the child.
72
 While the court does provide in 
Morgentaler, that the country does have a legitimate interest in the unborn, in Tremblay, the 
court seems to fall short of stating that a fetus could never have the right to life under Article 7 in 
certain contexts. This sets the stage for whether subsequent court cases implicating the use of 
drugs during a woman’s pregnancy.  
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70
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71
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72
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C. The Dominican Republic  
 The Dominican Republic takes a very different approach from that of the United States 
and Canada, and is a signatory to a number of international conventions which both affirm the 
country’s constitutional position regarding fetal rights and in some cases, contradicts it. In 2009, 
the Dominican Republic’s National Assembly voted to amend the Constitution originally drafted 
1966, to address the issue of fetal rights,
73
 and by extension, abortion.
74
 Article 37 of the Carta 
Magna provides: “The right to life is inviolable from conception to death. The death penalty 
cannot be established, pronounced or applied in any case.”75 The amendment was introduced by 
President Leonel Fernandez, with the Catholic Church lobbying vigorously on its behalf.
76
 Some 
who closely followed the country’s amendment process add that the President acquiesced to the 
Christian conservative block with Article 37, in order to obtain the necessary support for other 
reforms.
77
 The amendment, which bans abortion, even when the mother’s life is at risk or when 
the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest, is among the most restrictive in Latin America and 
was vehemently opposed by women’s groups within the Dominican Republic, as well as 
                                                          
73
 Sharon Camp and Dr. Fatima Juarez, A Dangerous Trend: Dominican Republic Adopts Draconian 
Abortion Restriction, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD, (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharon-l-camp/a-dangerous-trend-dominic_b_203459.html. 
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international human rights groups.
78
 Aside from Article 37, the country’s penal code also 
criminalizes abortion and targets anyone who provides an abortion, helps to provide it, or any 
woman who obtains one.
79
 As will be discussed, infra, this amendment, combined with the 
criminal law making it a crime to obtain or assist in obtaining an abortion, creates a situation 
where the life of the unborn is often prioritized over the life of the woman. The practical effect of 
Article 37 is that fetal rights overcome those of the mother.  
 Unlike the United States, the Dominican Republic has a constitutional article specifically 
addressing privacy, however there is no indication that the Dominican Republic’s Supreme Court 
has extended the concept of privacy to extend to a woman’s reproductive choice and further, 
there is no indication that it has been fully applied in the context of marriage.
80
 Along with 
Article 37, the Dominican Republic also includes an article that provides that a marriage is 
“constituted by natural or legal ties [vinculos], by the free decision of a man and a woman to 
contract matrimony or by the responsible will to conform it.”81 The practical effect of Article 37 
seems to indicate a conflict with other provisions provided in the constitution, namely articles 
pertaining to human dignity.
82
 While the constitution does not address privacy, it does 
specifically include human dignity and equality. In fact, the concept of human dignity and liberty 
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is included in multiple sections of the constitution.
83
  The article provisions including a right to 
personal integrity, a right to human dignity, a right to intimacy and personal honor, and a right to 
equality.
84
 This is interesting and even perplexing, given that Article 37 seems to stand in direct 
contrast with a woman’s right to human dignity and her right to intimacy; especially in light of 
the fact that some legal scholars have discussed the comparison between privacy and dignity and 
have deemed a woman’s dignity and her right to reproductive choice as synonymous.85 Article 
37 also appears to stand in contrast to the article addressing equality, as the article determining 
life as “inviolable” from conception to death, would seem to pertain mostly, if not solely to a 
woman, based on the unique characteristic of potential pregnancy. One must question the 
Dominican Republic’s commitment to human dignity with such restrictions on a woman’s right 
to carry a pregnancy to term, and thus, the emphasis the country seems to place on protecting the 
life of the unborn.  
 The conflict as it relates to the country’s interpretation of dignity is not confined to the 
country’s constitution and its provisions, but is also apparent between its constitution and other 
international agreements of which the Dominican Republic is a signatory.
86
  Article 26 of the 
Constitution provides that “the norms in force from ratified international covenants will govern 
in the internal environment.”87 It also states that, “[t]he norms in force of ratified international 
agreements will govern within the domestic sphere [ambito interno], once [they have been 
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published] in official manner.”88 One of the international human rights conventions to which the 
Dominican Republic is a member of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). The Dominican Republic is a signatory to the 
convention and ratified the international agreement.
89
 The convention is described as an internal 
bill of human rights for women and is the only human rights treaty that affirms the reproductive 
choice of women.
90
 The relevant portion of CEDAW provides, “[t]he same rights to decide 
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights[.]”91  By including 
Article 26 in its constitution, the Dominican Republic is required to honor CEDAW. However, 
by amending the constitution to add Article 37, it is clear the amendment contradicts the article 
included in the United Nations Convention to which the Dominican Republic is a party.
92
 
Therefore, the Dominican Republic cannot both abide by both Article 26, adhering to the 
requirements the country has agreed to in international law and Article 37, which greatly hinders 
and restricts a woman’s reproductive choice.93  
In addition to the conflict discussed above, the country’s signing and ratifying of multiple 
international agreements has created a conflict, even between those agreements. For example, 
while CEDAW provides for a woman’s reproductive choice, the the Dominican Republic is also 
a signatory under the American Convention of Human Rights. The American Convention of 
Human Rights was ratified by the Dominican Republic in 1978, and was adopted by many 
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several other countries in the Americas.
94
 Article 4 of the Convention specifically provides for a 
right to life, beginning at conception.
95
 In addition to the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the Dominican Republic is also a signatory to the International Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, which outlines the basic rights that children everywhere deserve, including the right 
to survival and the right to be from abuse and undue influence.
96
 The convention also includes 
Article 6, which provides that all children have the inherent right to life.
97
 The agreement to this 
convention also provides potential conflict with Article 37, especially if the pregnant woman is 
young woman less than 18 years of age. In adhering to Article 37, one child’s life may 
essentially be sacrificed for another.  An unfortunate but stark reality of Article 37, which is 
demonstrative of a conflict with a convention that provides that all children have an inherent 
right to life. It is essentially a sacrificing of one child’s life over another, under Article 37.  
 As indicated above, the Dominican Republic’s amendment of its constitution has not only 
provided the legal right to life to a fetus, but has in some cases, has even been interpreted as 
eclipsing the pregnant woman’s right to life. Article 37, as well as other articles in the 
constitution enumerating dignity, and Article 26, which addresses the country’s intent to adhere 
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to international agreements to which it is a signatory, indicates an inherent conflict in the 
Dominican Republic’s Constitution.98  
Part III The Fetus as Plaintiff  
A. The United States 
 In the area of tort law, the United States has bestowed some degree of legal rights on a 
fetus for injuries it sustained in the womb that resulted in a miscarriage or stillbirth. Most states, 
for example, provide that a fetus is a “person” for purposes of wrongful death statutes.99 When a 
wrongful death suit for the death of a fetus is before the court, courts tend to take one of two 
approaches. They either find that the fetus was viable at the time of sustaining injuries which 
resulted in the prenatal death, allowing for recovery or that it was not and therefore, no recovery 
can be made on the death of a fetus.
100
 Still, a minority of courts still find that even if a fetus was 
viable at the time of injury, a surviving relative or administrator of the estate still may not 
recover.
101
 Courts that take the view that a fetus cannot recover, regardless of viability at the time 
of the accident, state that the wrongful death statute is to be strictly construed and that if the 
legislature had intended the unborn to be protected under these statutes, it would have addressed 
the unborn child.
102
 Courts also reason that the fetus is not a distinct, legal entity apart from the 
mother and therefore, cannot sustain a wrongful death cause of action.
103
 For example, Florida is 
a state in the minority that does not allow for recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus and 
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adheres to a “born-alive” type rule.104 In a Florida Supreme Court case involving the issue, 
parents sued the hospital and the physicians for injuries sustained by the fetus during delivery 
that resulted in a stillbirth.
105
 First, the court determined that there is no cause of action under 
Florida’s Wrongful Death Act because a “fetus” is not a person under the statute.106 However, in 
an attempt to remain consistent with the state’s public policy and without circumventing the 
state’s wrongful death statute, the court did provide that the parents are entitled to sue for 
negligent stillbirth, which limits the damages to mental pain and anguish, and medical 
expenses.
107
 It should be noted here that the court did not address viability, however given the 
point at which the mother was delivering (at 41 weeks), the fetus would have been deemed 
“viable.”  
The issue of viability and its determination as to whether a wrongful death action on 
behalf of a fetus can be sustained seems to differ state to state. In Georgia for example, a 
wrongful death action may only be sustained against a third party if the fetus is viable, meaning 
that there must be “quickening” or movement inside the womb.108 It is not necessary that the 
mother feel the movement, but evidence must be presented that the unborn child is capable of 
movement.
109
 
 Other states allow wrongful death claims to be asserted and have cited reasons that 
include the weight of modern authority that allows for this type of cause of action on behalf of 
the unborn, that a fetus is more than just a part of the mother and deserves legal recognition as 
so, and that a born-alive rule is illogical and arbitrary, for example, in a case where twins are 
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involved and one dies before birth, while the other dies immediately after.
110
 Courts also add that 
these types of statutes tend to be remedial in nature and therefore, should be construed liberally 
to include the unborn in the scope of those it meant to cover.
111
 Virginia did not recognize a 
wrongful death cause of action on behalf of a fetus until recently. In April 2012, the Virginia 
Senate approved and the Governor signed into law a bill that allows expectant parents to sue over 
the wrongful death of a fetus.
112
 One supporter of the legislation said the change was made to 
correspond with recent changes in the criminal law, allowing for the criminal prosecution for 
fetal homicide.
113
 Importantly, the bill explicitly includes that “no cause of action may be 
brought against the natural mother of the fetus.”114 
 The assertion made by the supporter regarding corresponding changes in the criminal 
law is demonstrative of the “slippery slope” problem with expanding legal rights for the fetus 
and in a sense, expanding the definition of “person” under these wrongful death statutes. The 
supporter is referring to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, which will be discussed infra in 
Part IV and provides that a third party may be prosecuted when certain federal crimes are 
committed against the fetus that in its death.
115
 The issue here is that some courts do use one, 
limited expansion or exception regarding fetal rights in one area of law, and then deem it to 
apply to others. This therefore, creates legal rights for the fetus, independent of the woman 
carrying the unborn child and promotes the notion that the fetus is a separate entity from the 
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mother. An example precisely on point is a case heard before the Alabama Criminal Court of 
Appeals, Ankrom v. State of Alabama, CR-09-1148, 2011 WL 3781258 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 
2011) which will be discussed at length in Part IV.
116
 In support of the court’s holding that an 
unborn child falls within the state’s chemical endangerment statute, and that a pregnant woman 
may be charged under the statute for drug use during her pregnancy, the court referred to the 
state’s interpretation of “child” in its wrongful death statute.117 Judge Burke wrote that, “the 
Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted the term “minor child” in Alabama’s wrongful-death-of-
minor statute to include a viable fetus that received prenatal injuries causing death before a live 
birth.”118 The court goes on stating that,”…not only have the courts of this State interpreted the 
term “child” to include a viable fetus in other contexts, the dictionary definition of the term 
“child “ explicitly includes an unborn person or fetus.”119 In light of the fact that courts may and 
do interpret a move in one area of law to expand fetal rights or expand a statute, as representative 
of a state’s overall general public policy to do so, is a very valid concern and establishes a 
precedent for courts to broaden legal rights for the unborn.   
 Another issue, which was addressed by Virginia’s new statute, is ensuring that a 
wrongful death action cannot be asserted against the natural mother of the fetus. This scenario 
was present before the Supreme Court of Arkansas, when a father filed a wrongful death action 
against a mother’s estate when she drove her car into a bridge, killing herself and the fetus.120  
The court first found that the suit was barred because the doctrine of parental immunity applied, 
which provides that a minor that is not emancipated, does not have a cause of action against a 
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parent for an unintentional tort 
121
  The court went on to state that because the fetus’ injury was a 
result of negligence on behalf of the mother, the parental immunity doctrine applies.
122
 In 
another case before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, a child born alive filed a negligence suit 
against her mother for personal injuries she sustained in the womb, which she alleged were 
caused by her mother’s negligent driving.123  The plaintiff child was delivered emergency C-
section and was hospitalized for 23 days after with breathing difficulties and asthma; problems 
the plaintiff alleged she still had to deal with at the time of suit.
124
 The court first determined that 
due to the unique relationship between a mother and her fetus, a legal duty of care cannot be 
imposed on the mother.
125
 The court added that by recognizing a pregnant woman’s duty of care 
to her fetus would present numerous other circumstances that could give rise to litigation, and it 
would force courts to pinpoint the time in which such a duty would arise.
126
 In conclusion, the 
court added that “there are inherent and important differences between a fetus, in utero, and a 
child already born, that permits a bright line to be drawn around the zone of potential tort 
liability of one who is still biologically joined to an injured plaintiff.”127 This case demonstrates 
the court’s concern with making law that would provide a severing between the fetus and the 
mother, which would provide legal rights to the fetus that could be used against the natural 
mother.  
The American Civil Liberties Union and other advocacy organizations have stated that 
while one should be compensated for the loss of a pregnancy and the pain that accompanies that 
loss, the prospective parent should be the one bringing the suit, not bringing it on behalf of the 
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stillborn fetus.
128
  Few would deny that the harm and anguish that can come as a result of a 
stillbirth should be compensated, but how it should be compensated is often the inquiry of which 
spurs the most debate. However, the loss could be compensated through the existing tort 
framework or through a cause of action such as negligent still birth. Also, in an effort to prevent 
mothers from having to defend against such causes of action, legislators should take notice of 
Virginia’s recent bill, which explicitly provides that the wrongful death cause of action cannot be 
asserted against the fetus’ natural mother.  This not only prevents a court from deriving from the 
state’s civil code a general, legal interest in broadening a fetus’ legal rights, but it also maintains 
that the legal interest between a mother and her fetus is very unique and the two not be made out 
to be legal adversaries.   
B. Canada 
 Legal precedent in Canada has adhered to the country’s “born-alive” rule which provides 
that private legal rights do not attach to a fetus, and only attach upon birth.
129
 Canada operates on 
a common law system, while Quebec utilizes its own civil code.
130
 As discussed in Tremblay, the 
fetus has no rights in private law, and the only exception to this is that the fetus is granted rights 
as a beneficiary of a will or donation.
131
  The court however reasons that this is provided in the 
common law system however, only to protect the interests for the child once it is born.
132
 Also, 
in regard to the Civil Code in Quebec, the court in Tremblay stated that the provisions that do 
refer to the fetus, do so in reference to inheritance.
133
 The court however countered this argument 
adding that four out of the seven sections of the Civil Code cited by the respondent specifically 
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state that the legal rights provided in these sections are not granted unless the fetus is born alive 
and viable.
134
 The court again, maintained that the civil justification for fetal rights rests on a 
“legal fiction in civil law,” and that the purpose of the rights is to preserve them so that they may 
attach at birth.
135
  
 A Canadian Supreme Court case discussing the ability of a fetus to issue and prenatal 
conduct is Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 (Can). In that case before the court, a 
grandfather brought suit against the mother for negligent driving that resulted in the birth of a 
child with cerebral palsy.
136
 The child was born by an emergency Caesarean after the accident.
137
 
The court narrowed the question to whether a mother should be held liable for the damages 
sustained by her born-alive child, and held that an action against the mother for prenatal injuries 
cannot be maintained.
138
  In making its decision, the court considered whether a duty of care 
should be imposed on the mother and the privacy implications on a woman, if this type of suit is 
to be permitted. 
139
 First, the court referred to another Canadian Supreme Court case, where the 
court held that before “imposing a duty of care, the court must be satisfied: (1) that there is a 
sufficiently close relationship between the parties to give rise to the duty of care; and (2) that 
there are no public policy considerations which ought to negative or limit the scope of the duty, 
the class of persons to whom it is owed, or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise.”140 
The court opined that while previous cases have deemed the mother-fetus entity as one, this case 
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permits the fetus and mother to be viewed as two distinct entities given the facts of the case.
141
 
While the first prong is satisfied regarding the relationship between the parties, the court stated 
that the second prong regarding the public policy considerations indicate that a duty of care 
should not be imposed.
142
 It cited several reasons against imposing a duty of care, including that 
there are many circumstances, such as work environments, where a woman has no choice but to 
take certain risks and that allowing a child to sue in tort against its mother based on prenatal 
injuries has the potential for negative repercussion on the mother-child relationship.
143
 
Furthermore, a reasonable pregnant woman standard would be unworkable, as the various 
lifestyle of women, some a result of economic realities, would not lend itself to a fair application 
of the standard.
144
 
 The court also examined the woman’s personal autonomy and privacy right, and while it 
did not refer to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it focused on the public policy 
aspect and on the unique relationship between a mother and her unborn child.
145
 The court 
determined that to hold a woman liable in tort to the prenatal injuries sustained by her child due 
to negligence, would be subjecting even her most mundane activities to judicial scrutiny.
146
 In 
addition, the court highlighted the main difference between holding a third-party liable versus a 
mother liable for prenatal injuries, and that unlike third-parties, everything from strenuous 
activity to a fall, could render the mother liable.
147
 The court believed the public policy and the 
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potential affects of an imposition of a duty of care would have on a woman’s privacy rights as 
well as on the family unit as a whole, indicate that such a ruling would be unwise and unjust.
148
  
 The decision set out in Tremblay, as well as Dobson, adopt the standard that legal rights 
do not adhere to a fetus until birth, and further, that the unique relationship between mother and 
fetus, in the civil sense, prohibit suit for prenatal injury. It is also important to note that in 
making its decision, especially in Dobson, the court relies heavily on public policy and the 
potential ramification of imposing a duty of care on a mother, on both her privacy interests as 
well as on family unit as a whole.  
C. The Dominican Republic  
 The Dominican Republic’s tort law as it relates to the unborn is limited. First, there is no 
wrongful death statute on point in the Dominican Republic. However, damages have been 
awarded to a decedent’s close relatives, based on the country’s civil code which has granted 
damages to a decedent’s close relative.149 In France, the courts have allowed negligence suits to 
go forward, to recover from the damage caused to the fetus in utero.
150
  
 Aside from the limited recovery available in the Dominican Republic, in which one could 
recover by reference to French law, the fetus also has a right to inherit property. According to 
Article 725 of the Civil Code, the only legal heirs “excluded” from being able to receive property 
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include a child not yet conceived and a child born “not violable.”151 In interpreting this statute, 
Dominican Republic Supreme Court Justice Victor J. Castellanos wrote in an article that Article 
725, “establishes as a requirement to inherit, the existence of the heir at the time of opening of 
succession, a human being conceived is a member of a succession and cannot be excluded from 
it, so that our system gives Dominican civil human embryos and fetuses the category of human 
beings with the right to inherit.”152  
 In addition to Article 725, Article 906 of the civil code also states in regard to inheritance 
that a child need only be conceived to inherit property by will.
153
 These two articles provided by 
the country’s civil code indicate the extent to which, at least in the civil sense, that fetal rights are 
recognized in the Dominican Republic.  
Part IV The Fetus as Victim  
A. The United States 
 In March 2004, in response to the highly publicized Laci Peterson case
154
, President 
George W. Bush signed into law the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (UVVA). The UVVA 
provides that under federal law, in the commission of specified federal crimes, any person who 
“causes the death of or bodily injury to a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes 
place,” shall be charged with a separate offense, in addition to any other charges relating to the 
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acts committed against the mother.
155
 The law is broad in its definition of what constitutes an 
“unborn child” and while it states an “unborn child” includes a child in utero and who is carried 
in the womb, it does not address whether or not the fetus must be viable nor does it address any 
specific point in the pregnancy when the law would be applicable.
156
 It also explicitly excludes 
prosecuting anyone for conduct relating to an abortion for which the pregnant woman consented, 
anyone medically treating the pregnant woman or unborn child, and any woman with respect to 
her unborn child.
157
 While signing the bill, President Bush stated in at a press conference in the 
East Room, that “violent crimes against pregnant women often have two victims. And therefore, 
in those cases, there are two offenses to be punished.”158 
 After the UVVA was signed into law, additional states that did not include the “unborn” 
in its homicide statutes started amending their homicide laws. Currently, 38 states have fetal 
homicide laws on the books and at least 23 of those states have fetal homicide laws that protect 
the fetus without specifying or addressing gestational age.
159
 For example, Alabama’s homicide 
statute provides that the term “person” under the statute states, “when referring to the victim of a 
criminal homicide or assault, means a human being, including an unborn child in utero at any 
stage of development, regardless of viability.”160 It also specifies that nothing in the act shall 
make it illegal to obtain an abortion.
161
 Other states specific that in order to be charged with a 
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fetal homicide, the unborn child must be either viable or have achieved a certain gestational 
age.
162
  
 With the addition of the “unborn child” as a victim in the statute, legal challenges were 
asserted in courts across the country, questioning the constitutionality of recognizing a fetus as a 
person, for purposes of criminal homicide. In Minnesota, the Supreme Court of that state heard a 
case involving a defendant convicted of murder of a woman and the woman’s fetus, which had 
the gestational age of approximately 27-28 days.
163
 The defendant challenged the conviction as it 
related to the unborn child, arguing that the homicide statute violated the 14
th
 Amendment as 
interpreted in Roe by including a non-viable fetus as a “person” and arguing that the statute was 
vague and therefore, should be void.
164
 Regarding the 14
th
 Amendment, the court stated that a 
woman electing to have an abortion versus a third party who destroys a fetus with a gunshot are 
not comparable in anyway, therefore, the argument by the defendant that persons  who were 
essentially in the same situation were being treated differently by the law was unavailing.
165
 In 
reference to the argument that a fetus was not considered a “person” according to the 14th 
Amendment as interpreted by Roe, the court reiterated a portion of the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding, that provides that states still maintain an important and legitimate interest in 
protecting the unborn.
166
 The court went on to state that the interest in protecting the unborn 
extends to whether the fetus is viable or non-viable, and that the issue of viability is “immaterial” 
to an equal protection challenge.
167
 In regard to the argument asserting vagueness, the court 
determined that the statute gives fair warning of the prohibited conduct and that the injury caused 
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to the fetus is comparable to a situation of transferred intent.
168
  The court added that, “criminal 
liability here only requires that the genetically human embryo to be a living organism that is 
growing into a human being.”169 
 These arguments are particularly important as we will see, in defending a mother against 
charges based on conduct that occurs during her pregnancy. First, it is important to note that fetal 
homicide laws play a role in charging women based on their alleged prenatal conduct because 
courts have and do look to portions of the criminal code in which to interpret the words “child” 
and “person.” Also, it should be noted that while some states do acknowledge criminal sanctions 
for the harm of a fetus, they do so through heightened penalties and not with additional charges 
that serve to further distinguish between mother and fetus.
170
 Homicide statutes including the 
fetus, and that go further by ignoring the United States Supreme Court regarding viability as it 
relates to the state’s compelling interest in protecting the unborn, provide courts that have 
deemed a woman’s prenatal conduct “criminal” with an additional basis upon which to rest their 
reasoning.  
 Utilizing some of the reasoning and statutory interpretation enunciated by courts in 
upholding convictions based upon the murder of the unborn, prosecutors of some states have 
turned to prosecuting mothers based on criminal conduct occurring during a pregnancy that is 
believed to have affected the fetus. As discussed supra in Part I, prosecutors in Alabama have 
been charging women under a chemical-endangerment statute.
171
 Chemical endangerment is a 
law that has been on the books in Alabama since 2006, and it provides that, “chemical 
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endangerment is exposing a child to an environment in which controlled substances are 
produced.”172 While Amanda Kimbrough awaits oral argument before the Alabama Supreme 
Court on her case, another woman is also waiting and was the very first to be convicted under 
Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute for harm alleged to have done by to her fetus.  
 The other case that will go before the Alabama Supreme Court involves twenty-three 
year old Hope Ankrom. Ankrom has three children; the third was born in 2009 and weighed 
almost six pounds.
173
 Although the baby was healthy, he tested positive for marijuana and 
cocaine.
174
 In an interview with the New York Times, Ankrom admitted smoking pot, claiming 
that she only smoked it to help alleviate severe morning sickness.
175
 She continued to smoke it 
despite her doctors warnings that he could be criminally charged if she didn’t stop.176 She 
denied, however, the cocaine use.
177
 She had intended to quit smoking marijuana a few weeks 
before her due date, but the baby came six weeks early.
178
 After the child was born, the hospital 
called Alabama’s child protective service, which placed the children in the custody of her 
parents.
179
 Two weeks later, police came to the door with an arrest warrant.
180
 Ankrom plead 
guilty the chemical endangerment charge and she was given a suspended sentence with one 
year’s probation.181 Prosecutors were able to secure Ankrom’s conviction through an extremely 
broad statutory interpretation of the words “child” and “environment” in the state’s child 
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endangerment statute.
182
 The State argued that the word child extended to include unborn child, 
and that environment, extended to include the womb.
183
 The Criminal Court of Appeals upheld 
that statutory interpretation, first, by citing the State’s code articulating its policy to protect life, 
born and unborn.
184
 The court then went on to state that aside from the state’s public policy of 
protecting the unborn, the Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted the term “minor child” in the 
State of Alabama’s wrongful death statute to include a viable fetus.185 Further, the court provided 
that, “[u]nless the legislatures specifically states otherwise, the term “child” is simply a more 
general term that encompasses the more specific term “viable fetus.”186 
 Also key to the court’s analysis was a South Carolina Supreme Court case; the only case 
which has thus far sustained a conviction of a woman, based on an interpretation of a child 
endangerment statute and the word “persons” to include a viable fetus. In the case Whitner v. 
South Carolina, 328 S.C. 1 (1997), Cornelia Whitner pled guilty to criminal child neglect, after 
her baby was born and tested positive for cocaine. Whitner did not appeal her conviction to 8 
years in prison, but later filed a petition for Post Conviction for Relief.
187
 The court in Whitner 
considered South Carolina’s wrongful death statute, which applies to a viable fetus injured while 
in the womb as well as a fetus not born alive but sustaining prenatal injuries.
188
 Further, the court 
made reference to the fact that the court had previously held that the word person in a homicide 
statute included viable fetuses.
189
 It also considered the specific policy and goal of the child 
endangerment statute and added that when “coupled with the comprehensive remedial purpose of 
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the Code, this language supports the inference that the legislature intended to include viable 
fetuses within the scope of the Code’s protection.”190 In an attempt to reconcile why South 
Carolina is justified in upholding this interpretation, while most decisions in other state courts 
refuse to hold that maternal conduct may lead to criminal prosecution, the court simply that the 
other states had different case law, which explicitly refused to recognize a fetus as a human 
being.
191
 In justifying its decisions when compared to other courts around the country, the court 
stated that while other courts put more credence on “person” as defined by the medical 
community, the South Carolina Supreme Court rationale rests on the fact that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that states have a compelling interest in potential life.
192
 
  The arguments made on behalf of Whitner, Ankrom, and Kimbrough for the 
unconstitutionality of statutes applied to prenatal conduct mirror one another.  First, there is the 
argument that imposing criminal sanctions on a woman for the alleged harm done to her fetus is 
violating her privacy in procreation, and thereby, her privacy rights.
193
 The argument set forth in 
an amicus brief in support of Kimbrough’s position, is that including additional criminal 
sanctions stemming from the fetus’ exposure to illicit drugs, beyond that which will she be 
subject to due to the illegal drug use, will provide a woman in this situation with two choices: 
either carry the pregnancy to term and risk prosecution or abort the fetus.
194
 This in essence, 
infringes on a woman’s fundamental right to procreate and carry a fetus to term. There is 
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certainly the valid argument that a woman’s other option is to just stop taking drugs. While this 
is probably the best course of action, the argument fails to take into account the power of 
addiction. The treatment of the issue through imposing additional criminal charges, also stands in 
contrast to the position recognized in law that while charges may flow from acts stemming from 
drug addiction, one cannot be charged solely for “being” an addict.195 Illegal drug use is not a 
protected right amongst the list of privacy interests articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court, however it can be argued that the right to procreate and carry a pregnancy term is a 
fundamental right and it is impeded upon by this regulation that, while may be “narrowly-
tailored,” is not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the goal of deterring illegal 
substance abuse by pregnant women. 
Another argument against applying Alabama’s chemical-endangerment statute in this 
way, includes the argument that it is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violates Due Process 
by failing to provide a woman with notice as to what conduct constitutes criminal conduct under 
the statute.
196
 The chemical endangerment statute, as it is written, does not put a pregnant woman 
on notice that her conduct, which is already subject to prosecution, may be subject to further 
charges because of her pregnancy. The language of the statute does not mention a fetus or 
unborn child, and the current construction that is allowing this prosecution to go forward is based 
mostly on the prosecutor’s interpretation. Also, it is important to note that as a rule of statutory 
interpretation, ambiguous criminal statutes should be read in favor of the defendant, per the rule 
of lenity.
197
 While the dissent in Whitner believed the majority ignored the rule of lenity in 
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coming to its decision, the majority believed that there was no ambiguity in the statute and that 
read in light of South Carolina’s existing laws, that viable fetuses were intended to come within 
the scope of the statute.
198
  In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe and its 
affirmation of that decision in Casey, holding a fetus is not a person for purposes of the 14
th
 
Amendment, coupled with federal and state law that do provide some degree of legal rights to 
the unborn, it is apparent that there is ambiguity in the context and in the actual chemical-
endangerment statute and in the criminal neglect statute in Whitner.   
In addition to Due Process under the 14
th
 Amendment, Alabama’s interpretation of the 
state’s chemical endangerment statute also violates equal protection of the laws.199 As provided 
in U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), in order to sustain differential treatment based on 
gender, the state has the burden to show that the classification, “serves important government 
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.”200 First, the State of Alabama’s interpretation means that only 
pregnant women can be charged under this interpretation of the law. While not all women will 
decide to become pregnant or will become pregnant, the law interpreted in this way is only 
applicable to women. Secondly, The State of Alabama has stated its objective as caring for the 
well-being of the unborn and states its interest in potential life, however whether or not the 
discriminatory means of prosecuting pregnant women “relates to the achievement of those 
objectives,” is highly unlikely. First, as indicated above, the degree to which drug use during 
pregnancy affects a fetus is still unclear. Also, doctors and other medical professionals who 
understand the implications of addiction, state consistently that criminalizing drug use among 
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pregnant women deters women from getting the help they need, out of fear of criminal 
repercussions.
201
  This is especially the case, when there are more effective, less discriminatory 
means to further the state’s interest in the potential life of the unborn.202  
Perhaps the strongest argument against the use of Alabama’s chemical-endangerment 
statute include the public policy ramifications for charging women who have drug problems, 
above and beyond the charges they would already receive as a result of illegal drug use. First, 
imposing criminal liability on a woman’s prenatal conduct would be a sort of implicit 
encouragement of abortion among drug user.
203
 The consequences of the state’s chemical-
endangerment statute, makes it a crime to have a child, who may or may not be suffering from 
the effects of drug exposure, but yet having an abortion to prevent any criminal repercussions is 
constitutionally permissible.
204
 This provides a pregnant drug user, who may fear criminal 
prosecution, with justification for terminating a pregnancy to avoid possible jail time.
205
 In 
addition, it also encourages women struggling with dependency, to travel across borders, in order 
to have their child, which neither deters women who use drugs while pregnant from using them, 
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nor does it do anything to assist women battling with addiction.
206
  Also, it should be addressed 
that criminalizing such conduct fails to address the underlying reasons for drug use, and treats 
the problem as a crime, rather than an illness. A number of medical organizations have firmly 
stated their opposition to these additional charges based on prenatal conduct, because it does 
little to help drug-addicted women and because the true effects of drug use on the fetus are still 
unknown.
207
 Furthermore, it opens the door for additional charges on woman for a whole 
spectrum of prenatal conduct. This particular statute address illicit drug use, however there may 
be other conduct that may be deemed to have detrimental effects on a fetus that may be innocent 
in and of itself, that could be subjected to judicial scrutiny in light of its alleged affects on the 
fetus.   
It is also worth noting that the women who tend to be the target of such prosecutions, by 
and large, do not paint a sympathetic picture and are not unfamiliar with the criminal court 
system. For example, while Amanda Kimbrough was free on an appeal bond in connection with 
her chemical endangerment charge, her attorney Jake Watson said her bail bond was recently 
revoked because she was arrested for selling a controlled substance.
208
  Moreover, nowhere in 
the Whitner nor the Ankrom opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Alabama, is there any 
discussion or mention by the court of the nature of addiction and drug dependency, which is a 
telling indicator regarding the court’s approach to deciding this case.  
                                                          
206
 Interview with Farah Diaz-Tello, Staff Attorney, National Advocates for Pregnant Women (Oct. 2012) 
(Diaz-Tello said anecdotally, she has heard that women have traveled as far as Georgia, out of fear that 
giving birth in Alabama will result in prosecution.).  
207
 See Pam Belluck, Abuse of Opiates Soars in Pregnant Women, New York Times, April 30, 2012 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/health/research/prescription-drug-abuse-soars-among-
pregnant-women.html (The consequences of a pregnant woman’s drug use are far from certain, “and 
much more likely if the child had to contend with economic hardship, family instability, poor education, 
and other factors.).  
208
 Interview with Jake Watson, Attorney for Amanda Kimbrough (Oct. 22, 2012).  
40 
 
While the cases of Kimbrough and Ankrom are still pending before the Supreme Court of 
Alabama, there are other jurisdictions where prosecutors are interpreting state criminal statutes 
broadly to prosecute pregnant women for prenatal conduct that affects the fetus. In Indiana, a 
case is currently pending involving a woman who attempted suicide while pregnant. In 
December of 2010, Bei Bei Shuai tried to kill herself while eight months pregnant, after learning 
the man whom she had an affair with, was returning to his wife.
209
 She ingested rat poison and in 
a note to the man, she wrote that she and the unborn child were a burden to him, and that she was 
“taking this baby, the one you named Crystal with me to Hades.”210 Shuai eventually admitted to 
friends what she had done, and they rushed her to the hospital for treatment, where the unborn 
child she was carrying was born prematurely and died three days later.
211
 Shuai was charged with 
murder and attempted feticide, and the Court of Appeals of Indiana addressed only the murder 
charged, holding that Shuai is not immune from prosecution, because of her relationship with the 
child that was born after her suicide attempt.
212
 The main argument asserted by Shuai’s counsel 
was that the murder statute was ambiguous as applied to Shuai, since she was carrying the fetus 
and since prior case law in Indiana determined that a neglect statute does not “criminalize 
conduct that occurs prior to a child’s birth.”213 It also argued that the statute as written was 
intended to apply to third parties, not to the women carrying the fetus.
214
  The court rejected that 
argument, writing that the opinion regarding the neglect statute, had the word “dependent,” 
which lead to a different interpretation, and that the facts in this case, including a suicide note 
specifically mentioning the fetus, indicate that the plain language of the murder and feticide 
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statute applies to her.
215
 Like the court in Whitner, the court specifies that the fetus was “viable,” 
and that the statute specifically protects either a “viable fetus” or human being.216 Unlike the 
South Carolina Supreme Court however, the court did address the mental health issue, however it 
sided with the state’s argument that the death of the child was more than an unintended 
consequence of her suicide attempt, referring to the note Shuai left.
217
  This illustrates the 
conflict and the very issue that advocates for women in situations like Shuai say, is a double 
standard of sorts, as while suicide is not a criminal act, it all of the sudden becomes one if the 
person making the attempt is pregnant.
218
 Shuai’s trial is set for April.  
 As some jurisdictions adjudicate cases such as these, where statutory interpretation can 
lead to a collision between a woman’s privacy right and the state’s interest in protecting potential 
life, some states have carefully crafted legislation to avoid this type of court battle all together. In 
Missouri for example, a portion of the state’s child endangerment statute prevented the state 
from pursuing charges against a woman who gave birth to a child that tested positive for 
marijuana and methamphetamine.
219
 While the state’s child endangerment statute addresses 
children “under the age of 17,” the court interpreted that language by referring to another statute 
that explicitly excludes criminal sanctions against a woman for ingesting illegal drugs while 
pregnant or for failing to “properly” take care of herself during the pregnancy.220 In support of its 
position, the court wrote that the drug user is already subject to criminal charges and that 
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additional, pregnancy-related charges would be only to protect the fetus.
221
 This however, would 
allow for unlimited prosecution and make it very difficult to draw the line as to what behavior is 
subject to criminal sanctions.
222
  By explicitly stating this exception in the statute, the state has 
prevented these types of prosecutions from going forward, not because it lacks interest in the 
potential life, but because of the potential such prosecutions would have in infringing on a 
woman’s liberty interest and in dissuading women with drug addictions from seeking treatment.  
 Other states are still trying to determine the role prenatal drug use should play in child 
abuse and neglect cases and whether such conduct is sole justification for the removal of a child 
from the home. In New Jersey for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recently 
considered whether a mother would lose custody of her child solely because the newborn had 
cocaine in its system.
223
 The woman’s attorney argued that a showing of harm to the child is 
needed, and that maternal drug abuse is not sufficient, as in this case there is no indication that 
the child was harmed.
224
 New Jersey’s Department of Youth and Family Services offered up an 
argument based on generalities, stating that there is evidence that woman who use drugs while 
pregnant present dangers to children once their born and called them, “ticking time bombs.”225  
A decision on the issue has not yet been rendered by the court.    
 While it appears a portion of the statute, specifically excluding the prenatal conduct by 
mothers is the best approach to avoiding this kind of prosecution and poor public policy, some 
legal scholars have argued for imposing a legal duty on woman at a certain point in their 
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pregnancies.
226
 This approach however, is problematic, especially in regard to the issue of 
viability. The Supreme Court of the United States has not specifically identified the point at 
which a fetus is viable, however did hold that the stage approximately at the end trimester is the 
point at which the state may regulate abortion procedures if it is reasonably related to maternal 
health.
227
 The concept of viability remains fluid and inconsistent, not only as utilized in state 
legislation in regard to abortion restrictions
228
 but also scientifically, as doctors do not all agree 
on agree on the precise time in which a baby will be able to survive outside the womb.
229
 The 
issue of causation is also important in considering a duty of care, in that the medical effects of 
certain types of controlled substance on the fetus are still very much undetermined. Finally, 
creating a legal duty care does not address the main problem with criminalizing prenatal conduct; 
what kind of conduct should be banned and if banned and criminal liability results, it is quite 
likely to force pregnant drug-users further underground rather than encourage them to seek help.   
B. Canada  
 In Canada, attempts to pass a Canadian version of the U.S.’s Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act have failed. In 2008, the bill passed the House of Commons, however it eventually failed in 
the Senate.  This may be because some members of the liberal party viewed the bill as a 
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backdoor to criminalizing abortion, despite the provision advocates of the bill said would be 
included, which would have excluded women who obtain and those who provide abortions.
230
  
 Canadian prosecutors have tried in the past to charge third parties and mothers, for 
prenatal injuries, however the cases found in Canadian courts thus far, show that prosecutors 
have been unsuccessful as in the cases seen, the fetus was technically, not “born alive.” For 
example, in one Canadian Supreme Court case, two midwives were charged with criminal 
negligence for a botched delivery.
231
  The woman who had hired the midwives went into labor at 
home, with the two women by her side, however the child died in the birth canal.
232
 The court 
ruled that because the child was still in the birth canal when it died, the charges against the two 
women must be dismissed as the criminal code refers to a “person” and a fetus is not a “human 
being” for purposes of the code.233  This case indicates the strict adherence to the born-alive rule 
and the bright-line rule the court is forced to adhere to in enforcing it.  
 Regarding the criminal prosecution of a mother for harm to the fetus, an interesting case 
has recently gone before the Canadian Supreme Court, involving a woman charged with 
concealing the body of a child. Ivana Levkovic claims she fell and gave birth in her Ontario 
home, and a subsequent autopsy could not tell whether the baby died before, after, or during 
childbirth.
234
 The baby was found by the apartment superintendent, wrapped in blankets on the 
apartment balcony.
235
  Levkovic was charged with a criminal code section that prohibits 
concealing the death of a child, however child in the code is not articulated, and her counsel 
argued that the statute was vague and hence, violated her liberty rights provided in Section 7 of 
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
236
 Levkovic was acquitted, as the court believed 
the evidence was insufficient that the child was born alive.
237
 However, an appeals court held 
that the lower court erred and ordered a new trial, believing that that portion of the code referring 
to “child…died before birth,” was not actually vague and gave the defendant notice that her 
conduct would result in criminal liability.
238
 The new trial is on hold until the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, which is expected to address the meaning of the word “child” in the statute.  
 While there are currently no cases in Canada, where a woman is criminally charged for 
prenatal abuse, one case involving prenatal substance abuse may shed some light of those types 
of charges. In the Canadian Supreme Court case of Winnipeg Child and Family Services 
(Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] 3 SCR 925 (Can.), the court held that a pregnant woman 
abusing drugs may not be ordered into a treatment center for the protection of her child.
239
 The 
woman was five months pregnant with her child, and was addicted to sniffing glue.
240
 Two 
children she had prior to this pregnancy were permanently disabled and were being cared for by 
the state.
241
  The court held in a 7-judge majority that under Canadian law, a fetus is not a legal 
person and that no rights attach until birth, and that drawing an opposite conclusion would 
impede on a woman’s liberty.242  The court added in the majority opinion, that “[t]his is not a 
story of heroes and villains. It is the more prosaic and all too common story of people struggling 
to do their best in the face of inadequate facilities and the ravages of addiction.”243  While this 
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case involves prenatal substance abuse in the civil context, and the Canadian criminal code does 
not have a section similar to that of Alabama’s chemical-endangerment statute, it is helpful in 
determining how a Canadian court might deal with the issue of criminal sanctions against a 
mother for injuries to a child caused by her prenatal conduct. On one hand, since the fetus has no 
legal rights, it would seem that criminal liability would not attach, as the statutes in the criminal 
code seem to specifically include the term “human being,”244 and that he “means to cause him 
bodily injury.” The intent would be directed toward an entity that is viewed in the eyes of the law 
as having no rights. On the other hand however, the court has enunciated several times in various 
holdings involving the fetus that legal rights do attach, especially in the civil context, upon birth, 
and there has been no definitive answer from the court as to whether the fetus has a right to life 
under Section 7 or whether state protection of fetal interests may be sustained under Section 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
245
 If the child is born, then it would seem these 
legal rights would attach to illegal conduct occurring during the pregnancy. It is possible that the 
criminal sanctions however, would not pass Canada’s constitutional proportionality test under 
Section 1,
246
 as depending on what the Crown provides as its objective, the court could view 
prosecution as out of proportion to the objective.
247
 However, this does need to be viewed in 
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light of the fact that the Court in Morgentaler, refused to rule out or evaluate any claim to “fetal 
rights” as a constitutional issue in the case, which leaves room for future court decision to 
determine the issue.
248
 It is possible that the Canadian Supreme Court will come closer to 
addressing the issue, as it attempts to interpret the word “child” in one portion of the Canadian 
criminal code. A decision on this issue may come down in the coming weeks.
249
  
C. The Dominican Republic   
 While there is no equivalent to the Unborn Victims Act in the United States, through the 
Constitution’s Article 37 and the country’s criminal code, there are criminal repercussions for 
those who end the life or attempt to end the life of a fetus in the Dominican Republic. First, as 
discussed previously, Article 37 proscribes that everyone has the right to life from the moment of 
conception.
250
 In addition, Article 317 of the criminal code states that those who induce an 
abortion, as well as those who abort a fetus such as a doctor or anyone who assists a medical 
professional in aborting a fetus are subject to penalties, including imprisonment.
251
 Women who 
induce an abortion are subject to imprisonment ranging from two to five years, while doctors and 
other medical professionals that assist in an abortion may receive a penalty from five to twenty 
years.
252
 It should be noted however, that there is currently a movement before the Dominican 
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legislature to increase the penalties, increasing the time of imprisonment to a maximum of 30 
years.
253
 
 While there is no indication that the penal code has been used to prosecute pregnant 
women for drug use, like the Kimbrough case in the United States, it has been effectively used to 
prevent at least one young woman from receiving life-saving cancer treatment. In July, a 16-year 
old woman, which the media called “Esperanza” or “Hope” arrived at a hospital in the 
Dominican Republic to undergo potentially life-saving chemotherapy to treat her leukemia.
254
 
The girl, who was about 10 weeks pregnant at the time she was to undergo the treatment, was 
unable to find a doctor or hospital to treat her.
255
 Doctors were aware that chemotherapy would 
likely deform the fetus or possible kill it, which would be a crime under the law.
256
 Fearful of the 
criminal and constitutional repercussions, Esperanza did not receive treatment until 20 days after 
she was admitted into the hospital.
257
 Aside from the 20 day delay in treatment, Esperanza was 
also given a lower amount of chemotherapy, as an attempt to protect the fetus and to stay within 
the parameters of the law.
258
 Unfortunately however, days after the woman received the 
treatment, she suffered a miscarriage, then went into cardiac arrest where doctors were unable to 
revive her.
259
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 In Latin American countries where stringent anti-abortion measures outlaw abortion, 
even in the case of rape or incest, stories such as Esperanza’s, are not unheard of. For example, 
in 2006, a 13-year old girl from Peru learned she was pregnant after being raped by a man in her 
neighborhood.
260
 She was so upset at this discovery, that she attempted suicide by jumping off a 
roof, but survived and injured her spine.
261
 Despite the fact that the 13-year old girl's pregnancy 
was a result of rape, doctors refused to perform the surgery necessary to repair the damage to her 
back, out of fear of harming the fetus and breaking Peruvian law.
262
 The girl eventually 
miscarried and is now a quadriplegic.
263
 
 Activists and medical professionals that support exceptions the Dominican Republic’s 
anti-abortion measure claim Esperanza’s death is an example of the state, sanctioning a situation 
where the rights of the fetus overcame the rights of the mother – a 16-year old girl in this case.  
Dr. Lilliam Fondeur, a gynecologist in the Dominican Republic who brought media attention to 
Esperanza’s case by writing about it in an editorial in the country’s national newspaper, El 
Nacional, said that this result is unfortunately not surprising. While she said this is the first case 
of its kind that she is aware of in the Dominican Republic, the penalties tied to treating pregnant 
women weigh on doctors and in turn, affect the treatment pregnant women receive. For example, 
Dr. Fondeur said just a few weeks ago, a young woman came into her office, 16 to 17 weeks 
pregnant carrying twins.
264
 The twins however, were conjoined; they had “two faces,” but shared 
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a heart.
265
 While the woman wanted to have an abortion, the doctor was unable to help her and 
had to turn her away, due to the illegality of providing an abortion.
266
  
 Dr. Fondeur is not alone, in her assessment that the law in the Dominican Republic has 
the effect in some situations, of placing the life of the unborn over the life of the mother.
267
 Many 
women organizations, international organizations such as Amnesty International, and medical 
organizations within the country believe that the law not only places fetal rights above the rights 
of those already born, but that if serves to deepen the chasm between the country’s rich and poor. 
Dr. Fondeur says that for a fee, women interested in obtaining an abortion will speak to doctors 
to find out the drug needed to start the abortion process. This information however, costs money, 
and women who are poor often do not have the kind of access to the necessary information to 
have an abortion safely.
268
 While there does not appear to be any “chemical-endangerment” type 
law on the books in the Dominican Republic, it a woman arriving at the hospital after starting the 
abortion process, could possibly be charged under the applicable criminal code prohibiting 
abortions.  
 This indicates that while the law seeks to preserve the legal right of the unborn to life, in 
the process, it subjugates the right of the woman – a child herself in some instances- from the 
very same right to life secured by the Dominican Republic’s Constitution. Certainly, while there 
are no cases at this point of a woman being prosecuted for prenatal conduct alleged to have 
harmed the fetus, the abortion ban as it has been applied and used today in the Dominican 
Republic, would provide for a woman’s prosecution, should her conduct result in the death of her 
fetus.  
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Part V Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the view of fetal rights in the United States, Canada, and the Dominican 
Republic are different, and thus naturally shape the extent to which a woman may be prosecuted 
for prenatal conduct. While the Dominican Republic approach places too great an emphasis on 
the country’s interest in the unborn, Canada’s strict-adherence to its born-alive may be too harsh, 
and the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to delineate the point at which a government may have 
a compelling interest in the potential life under Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
 In light of the constitutional issues and the serious public policy implications, Alabama’s 
chemical-endangerment statute should not be applied to punish prenatal conduct. Existing 
criminal laws already target women, pregnant women, and men who use or possess illegal drugs, 
and additional charges stemming from that conduct, simply because one is pregnant, opens the 
door to bestowing more legal rights upon the fetus. While prenatal conduct should play a role in 
determining custody and parental rights, criminalizing prenatal conduct discourages women who 
are battling addiction from seeking treatment and may create a further blurring of the line 
between a woman’s privacy right and the compelling interest of the state in potential life.  
